Abstract. Our aim is to explain a general theory of inductive reasoning which is close enough to the concerns of language studies. In this set-up, the optimal prediction rate is assigned to the hypothesis considered most likely by a prior-free form of Bayesian inference. In terms of practical applications a most attractive form of this approach is embodied by the so-called minimum description length (MDL) principle. There, the most likely hypothesis is the one which minimizes the sum of the length of the description of the hypothesis and the length of the description of the data relative to the hypothesis. This theory is solidly based on a provably ideal method of inference using Kolmogorov complexity. We give references to several applications. Similar approaches should work for computational learning of features of language.
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world problems. To show that this can be done, the rst author and Qiong Gao, see 3, 4] , carried out an experiment in on-line learning to recognize isolated characters written in a particular person's handwriting.
Reasoning from`experience' to`truth' has been the subject of intricate theories scattered throughout vastly di erent areas such as philosophy of science, statistics and probability theory, computer science, and psychology. Kolmogorov complexity allows us to study many seemingly unrelated models or principles from a uni ed view point. These include, 12], the maximum likelihood principle, the maximum entropy principle, the minimum description length principle, induction by enumeration , and probably approximately correct (pac) learning. Each of these ideas has had a pronounced in uence in its respective eld: philosophy of science, statistics, arti cial intelligence, and theory of computing.
The Oxford English Dictionary de nes induction as the process of inferring a general law or principle from the observations of particular instances. This de nes precisely what we would like to call inductive inference On the other hand, we regard inductive reasoning as a more general concept than inductive inference, namely, as a process of re-assigning a probability (or credibility) to a law or proposition from the observation of particular instances. In other words, inductive inference draws conclusions that accept or reject a proposition, possibly without total justi cation, while inductive reasoning only changes the degree of our belief in a proposition. We need also to distinguish inductive reasoning from deductive reasoning (or inference). In deductive reasoning one derives the absolute truth or falsehood of a proposition. This may be viewed as a borderline case of inductive reasoning. A celebrated principle for induction is commonly attributed to William of Ockham (1290?{1349?).
Occam's razor. Entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity. According to Bertrand Russell, the actual phrase used by William of Ockham was: \It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer." This is generally interpreted as: Among the theories that are consistent with the observed phenomena, one should pick the simplest theory.
But is a simpler theory really better than a more complicated one? What is the proper measure of simplicity? Is x 100 +1 more complicated than 13x 17 +5x 3 + 7x + 11? In this context the contemporary philosopher Karl Popper pronounced that the razor is without sense since there is no objective criterion for simplicity. It is the aim of this paper to show that the principle can be given objective contents.
Example 0.1. Let us consider a simple example of inferring a nite grammar with one-letter terminals using Occam's razor. Let us measure`simplicity' by number of rules in the grammar. The sample data are: generated terminal strings: 0, 000, 00000, 000000000; not generated terminal strings: , 00, 0000, 000000; INDUCTIVE REASONING 3 For these data there exist many consistent nite grammars. Let S denote the starting nonterminal symbol of a grammar. A trivial consistent nite grammar is the rst one below, while the second grammar is the smallest consistent one.
S ! 0j000j00000j000000000; S ! 00Sj0
Intuitively, the trivial grammar just plainly encodes the data. We therefore do not expect that the grammar anticipates future data. On the other hand, the small grammar makes the plausible inference that the language generated consists of strings of odd number of 0's. The latter appeals to our intuition as a reasonable inference.
In the learning grammar example, it turns out that one can prove the following. The celebrated`Occam's Razor Theorem' in 1] states that if su cient data are drawn randomly from any xed distribution, then with high probability the smallest consistent grammar (or a`reasonably' small grammar which compresses the observations far enough) will with high probability correctly predict acceptance or rejection of most data which are drawn afterwards from this distribution. See also 13].
In contrast to Ockham, Thomas Bayes took a probabilistic view of Nature.
Assume we have observational data D.
Bayes' Rule. The probability of hypothesis H being true is proportional to the learner's initial believe in H (the prior probability) multiplied by the conditional probability of D given H.
Bayesian reasoning is mathematically ne but it has a weakness: it assumes knowledge of the prior probability. For many practical problems it is unclear how the prior probability should be de ned, how it can be found, or whether it exists at all. Take for example properties of the English language. It has been produced by di erent people from di erent times and social backgrounds. Can we claim that there is a de nite probability involved among di erent competing hypotheses about a certain aspect of the language? The historic dispute between Bayesians and non-Bayesians is related to such problems. Essentially combining the ideas of Ockham, Bayes, and modern computability theory, R.J. Solomono has successfully invented a`perfect' induction theory. First, combine Occam's razor principle and modern computability theory to obtain Kolmogorov complexity. With Kolmogorov complexity de ne a universal prior which dominates, up to a multiplicative constant, all computable prior probability distributions. Use this universal prior in Bayes' Rule substituting it for any computable prior probability which may actually hold. This results a general theory of inductive inference.
The notion of`simplicity' has dominated linguistic argumentation for much of its illustrious history (before Solomono was even conceived). For example, Grimm's and Verner's laws (about diachronic sound change) are based on simplicity arguments. Chomsky's masters thesis on the morphophonemics of Hebrew used simplicity as its central criterion, and Chomsky and Halle's pathbreaking (1968) "Sound Pattern of English" also invokes an explicit simplicity metric.
Halle has written two excellent papers on this topic, 6, 7] .
Bayesian Reasoning
On the one hand, it seems common sense to assume that people learn in the sense that they generalize from observations by learning a`law' that governs not only the past observations, but will also apply to the observations in the future. In this sense induction should`add knowledge'.
Yet how is it possible to acquire knowledge which is not yet present? If we have a system to deduce a general law from observations, then this law is only part of the knowledge contained in this system and the observations. Then, the law does not represent knowledge over and above what was already present, but it represents in fact only a part of that knowledge. This seeming contradiction is related to the distinction between`implicit knowledge' and`explicit (useful) knowledge'. We need to extract the latter from the former, and it may require time and or space to do so. If the resources required are forbiddingly large, then we cannot compute the useful knowledge from the implicit knowledge, even if we have all the information.
As an example consider a book on number theory. Given the axioms and inference rules of number theory, and the statements of the theorems in the book, we can in principle reconstruct all the proofs of the theorems by enumerating all valid proofs of the theory. However, nding the valid proofs is very hard (it took mankind 2000 years). Information which can only be reconstructed from a short description at the expense of great computational e ort is called`logically deep'. The theory of logical depth is due of G. Chaitin and C. Bennett, see for example 13] . It possibly gives some insight in the above paradox about the distinction between implicit knowledge and useable knowledge|for example, knowledge the user is aware of. This theory should be developed further, but it is out of the scope of this article.
The calculus of probabilities has come up with an induction principle which estimates the relative likelihood of di erent possible hypotheses.
Consider the situation in which one has a set of observations (say, sentences in some new language) D, and also a (possibly in nite) set of hypotheses (say, potential grammars): H 1 ; H 2 : : : For each hypothesis H i we would like to assess the probability that H i is the "correct" hypothesis (that is, the generating grammar), given the observation of D. This quantity, P(H i jD), can be described and manipulated formally in the following way. 
Despite the fact that Bayes' rule is just a rewriting of the de nition of conditional probability and nothing more, its interpretation and applications are most profound and caused much controversy during the past two centuries. In Equation 1.1, the H i 's represent the possible alternative hypotheses concerning the phenomenon we wish to discover. The term D represents the empirically or otherwise known data concerning this phenomenon. The term P(D), the probability of data D, may be considered as a normalizing factor so that
The term P(H i ) is called the a priori probability or initial probability of hypothesis H i , that is, it is the probability of H i being true before we see any data.
The term P(H i jD) is called a posteriori or inferred probability
The most interesting term is the prior probability P(H i ). In the context of machine learning, P(H i ) is often considered as the learner's initial degree of belief in hypothesis H i . In essence Bayes' rule is a mapping from a priori probability P(H i ) to a posteriori probability P(H i jD) determined by data D. In general, the problem is not so much that in the limit the inferred hypothesis would not concentrate on the true hypothesis, but that the inferred probability gives as much information as possible about the possible hypotheses from only a limited number of data. The continuous debate between the Bayesian and non-Bayesian opinions centered on the prior probability. The controversy is caused by the fact that Bayesian theory does not say how to initially derive the prior probabilities for the hypotheses. Rather, Bayes' rule only tells how they are to be updated. In the real world problems, the prior proabilities may be unknown, uncomputable, or even conceivably non-existent. This problem would be solved if we can nd a single probability distribution to use as the prior distribution in each di erent case, with approximately the same result as if we had used the real distribution. Surprisingly, this turns out to be possible up to some mild restrictions. The emphasis is on binary sequences only for convenience; observations in any alphabet can be so encoded in a way that is`theory neutral'.
A binary string x is a proper pre x of a binary string y if we can write x = yz for z 6 = . A set fx; y; : : : g f0; 1g is pre x-free if for any pair of distinct elements in the set neither is a proper pre x of the other. A pre x-free set is also called a pre x code. Each binary string x = x 1 x 2 : : : x n has a special type of pre x code, called a self-delimiting code, x = x 1 x 1 x 2 x 2 : : : x n :x n ; where :x n = 0 if x n = 1 and :x n = 1 otherwise. This code is self-delimiting because we can determine where the code word x ends by reading it from left to right without backing up. Using this code we de ne the standard self-delimiting code for x to be x 0 = l(x)x. It is easy to check that l( x) = 2n and l(x 0 ) = n + 2 log n.
Let T 1 ; T 2 ; : : : be a standard enumeration of all Turing machines, and let 1 ; 2 ; : : : be the enumeration of corresponding functions which are computed by the respective Turing machines. That is, T i computes i . These functions are the partial recursive functions or computable functions.
Let h i be a standard invertible e ective one-one encoding from N N to pre x-free recursive subset of N. For example, we can set hx; yi = x 0 y 0 . We insist on pre x-freeness and recursiveness because we want a universal Turing machine to be able to read an image under h i from left to right and determine where it ends. Definition 1.2. The pre x Kolmogorov complexity of x given y (for free) is K(xjy) = min p;i fl(hp; ii) : i (hp; yi) = x; p 2 f0; 1g ; i 2 Ng:
A Turing machine T computes a function on the natural numbers. However, we can also consider the computation of real valued functions. For this purpose we consider both the argument of and the value of as a pair of natural numbers according to the standard pairing function h i. We de ne a function from N to the reals R by a Turing machine T computing a function as follows.
Interprete the computation (hx; ti) = hp; qi to mean that the quotient p=q is the rational valued tth approxmation of f(x). Definition 1.3. A function f : N ! R is enumerable if there is a Turing machine T computing a total function such that (x; t + 1) (x; t) and lim t!1 (x; t) = f(x). This means that f can be computably approximated from below. If f can also be computably approximated from above then we call f recursive.
A function P : N ! 0; 1] is a probability distribution if P x2N 1. (The inequality is a technical convenience. We can consider the surplus probability to be concentrated on the unde ned element u 6 2 N). INDUCTIVE REASONING 7 Consider the family EP of enumerable probability distributions on the sample space N (equivalently, f0; 1g ). It is known, 13] , that EP contains an element m that multiplicatively dominates all elements of EP. That is, for each P 2 EP there is a constant c such that c m(x) > P(x) for all x 2 N.
The family EP contains all distributions with computable parameters which have a name, or in which we could conceivably be interested, or which have ever been considered. The dominating property means that m assigns at least as much probability to each object as any other distribution in the family EP does.
In this sense it is a universal a priori by accounting for maximal ignorance. It turns out that if the true a priori distribution in Bayes Rule is recursive, then using the single distribution m, or its continuous analogue the measure M on the sample space f0; 1g 1 (de ned later), is provably as good as using the true a priori distribution.
We also know, 13] , that ? log m(x) = K(x) O (1):
That means that m assigns high probability to simple objects and low probability to complex or random objects. For example, for x = 00 : : : 0 (n 0's) we have K(x) = K(n) + O(1) log n + 2 log log n + O(1) since the program print n times a`0' prints x. (The additional 2 log log n term is the penalty term for a self-delimiting encoding.) Then, 1=(n log 2 n) = O(m(x)). But if we ip a coin to obtain a string y of n bits, then with overwhelming probability K(y) n?O(1) (because y does not contain e ective regularities which allow compression), and hence m(y) = O(1=2 n ). We also know, 13] , that ? log M(x) = K(x) O(log K(x)); Again this means that M assigns high probability to simple objects and low probability to complex or random objects. For example, for x = 00 : : :0 (n 0's) we have M(x) 1=(n log O(1) n). But if we ip a coin to obtain a y of n bits, then with overwhelming probability M(y) = O(1=2 n ).
Solomono 's Universal Prior
Consider theory formation in science as the process of obtaining a compact description of the past observations. The investigator observes increasingly larger initial segments of an in nite binary sequence X as the outcome of an in nite sequence of experiments on some aspect of nature. To describe the underlying regularity of X, the investigator tries to formulate a theory that governs X, consistent with past experiments. Candidate theories (hypotheses) are identied with computer programs that compute binary sequences starting with the observed initial segment.
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First assume the existence of a probability distribution over the continuous sample space = f0; 1g 1 . Such a distribution is called a measure and is de ned by the probabilities of elements belonging to certain subsets of . Denote by (x) the probability of a sequence starting with x, that is, the probability that it is an element of the set of all sequences in that start with x. For : f0; 1g ! 0; 1] to be a measure it must satisfy (i) ( ) 1; and (ii) (x) (x0) + (x1). (The inequalities are a technical convenience. We can obtain equalities by concentrating the surplus probabilities on the unde ned element u 6 2 f0; 1g: ( ) + (u) = 1 and (x) = (x0) + (x1) + (xu).)
The inference problem can now be formulated as follows. Given a previously observed data string S, predict the next symbol in the sequence, that is, extrapolate the sequence S. In terms of the variables in Equation 1.1, H a is the hypothesis that the sequence under consideration continues with a. Data 
Generally, we denote (H a jD S ) by (ajS). In terms of inductive inference
or machine learning, the nal probability (ajS) is the probability of the next symbol being a, given the initial sequence S. Obviously we now only need the prior probability to evaluate (ajS). The idea is to approximate the unknown proper prior probability .
Similar to De nition 1.3 one can de ne enumerable measures, 13]. Just like in the case of probability distributions over a discrete sample space, all measures with computable parameters we may be conceivably interested in are enumerable.
The family of enumerable measures is denoted by EM. It can be proved, 13] , that EM contains a universal measure, denoted by M, such that for all in this class there exists a constant c such that c M(x) (x) for all x. We say that M dominates . We also call M the a priori probability, since it assigns maximal probability to all hypotheses in absence of any knowledge about them. Now instead of using Formula 2.1, we estimate the conditional probability (yjx) that the next segment after x is y by the expression
Now let in Formula 2.1 be an arbitrary computable measure. This case includes all computable sequences. If the length of y is xed, and the length of x grows INDUCTIVE REASONING 9 to in nity, then it can be shown similar to 19], see 
with -probability one. In other words, the conditional a priori probability is almost always asymptotically equal to the conditional probability. It has also been shown by Solomono that the convergence is very fast and if we use Formula 2.2 instead of the real value Formula 2.1, then our inference is almost as good. a pre x-free programming language, see above.) This means that, using M, the expected prediction error S n in the nth prediction goes to 0 faster than 1=n. Used as the prior in Bayes Rule, this proves mathematically that the inferred probability using prior M converges very fast to the inferred probability using the actual prior . The problem with Bayes' Rule has always been the determination of the prior. Using M universally gets rid of that problem, and is provably perfect. The point of using Solomono 's prior is not that we eventually converge to the true hypothesis, but that we do it very fast and make small errors in predictions also in the initial segments. Note that for any prior distribution the inferred probability will eventially converge. This can be seen as follows. Suppose we have a bag of coins which are bent in di erent ways, and hence have di erent probabilities of coming up heads. Picking a coin from the bag we want to estimate the probability of ipping a head. Initially, before we have experimented with the coin, this probability will be totally determined by the relative frequencies of coins with di erent probabilities of coming up heads. These relative frequencies consitute the true prior probability distribution over the di erent hypotheses of the form \the coin has 0.x probability of coming up heads". Using this prior probability in Bayes' rule gives the best predictions. However, whatever prior probability we choose (provided it assigns positive probability to each hypothesis), in the long run of gathering experimental data by ipping the coin the inferred probability in Bayes rule will converge to probability 1 for the correct hypothesis and probability 0 for the incorrect hypotheses, by the law of large numbers. However, using the universal prior we converge almost as fast as possible.
We now come to the punch line: Bayes' rule using the universal prior distribution yields Occam's Razor principle. Namely, if several programs could generate S0 then the shortest one is used (for the prior probability), and further if S0 has a shorter program than S1 then S0 is preferred (that is, predict 0 with higher probability than predicting 1 after seeing S). Bayes' rule via the universal prior distribution also gives the so-called indi erence principle in case S0 and S1 have roughly equal length shortest programs which`explain' S0 and S1, respectively.
Recursion Theory Induction
There are many di erent ways of formulating concrete inductive inference problems in the real world. We abstract matters as much as possible short of losing signi cance, following E.M. Gold, 5].
We are given an e ective enumeration of partial recursive functions f 1 ; f 2 ; : : : .
Such an enumeration can be the functions computed by Turing machines, but also the functions computed by nite automata. We want to infer a particular function f. To do so, we are presented with a sequence of examples D = e 1 ; e 2 ; : : : ; e n , containing elements (possibly with repetitions) of the form e = (x; y; 0) if f(x) 6 = y; With increasing n, the denominator term is monotonically nonincreasing. Since all examples eventually appear, the denominator converges to a limit.
For each k, the inferred probability of f k is monotonically nondecreasing with increasing n, until f k is inconsistent with a new example, in which case it falls to zero and stays there henceforth. Only the f k 's that are consistent with the sequence of presented examples have positive inferred probability. At each step we infer the f k with the highest posterior probability. At some point the rst copy of f in the sequence will have the highest probability, and will keep it henceforth. This is called induction by enumeration. The classical form is to eliminate all functions which are inconsistent with D from left to right in the enumeration of functions, up to the position of the rst consistent function. We receive a new example e, set D := D; e, and repeat this process. Eventually, the new rst function in the enumeration is a copy of f and it doesn't change any more. This deceptively simple idea has generated a large body of sophisticated literature.
This way one learns more and more about the unknown target function, and approximates it until the correct identi cation has been achieved. \I wish to construct a precise model for the intuitive notion`able to speak a language' in order to be able to investigate theoretically how it can be achieved arti cially. Since we cannot write down the rules of English which we require one to know before we say he can`speak English,' an arti cial intelligence which is designed to speak English will have to learn its rules from implicit information. That is, its information will consist of examples of the use of English and/or of an informant who can state whether a given usage satis es certain rules of English, but cannot state these rules explicitly. : : : A person does not know when he is speaking a language correctly; there is always the possibility that he will nd that his grammar contains an error. But we can guarantee that a child will eventually learn a natural language, even if it will not know when it is correct." Gold]
How do we use the universal prior probability? Set P(H k ) = m(k), with m( ) the universal discrete probability. We have seen, Equation
with K( ) the pre x complexity. With this prior, at each stage, P( jD) will be largest for the simplest consistent hypothesis. In the limit, this will be the case for H k such that f k = f and K(k) is minimal. In many enumerations we will nd the proper H k much faster using m( ) as prior than using 1=k(k + 1 we have an enumeration of in nite sequences !. These sequences form a binary tree with the root labeled and each ! is an in nite path starting from the root. We are trying to learn a particular function f, in the form that we predict ! n from the initial sequence ! 1 : : : ! n?1 for all n 1 . We want to analyze the number of errors we make in this process. If our prediction is wrong (say, we predict a 0 and it should have been a 1), then this counts as 1 mistake.
Lemma 3.1. Assume the discussion above and we try to infer f = f n . There is an algorithm which makes less than 2 log n mistakes in all in nitely many predictions. for each x 2 f0; 1g . (Note that is a simple computable approximation to M.)
The prediction algorithm is very simple. If (0jx) 1=2, then predict 0, otherwise predict 1.
Suppose that the target f = f n . If there are k mistakes, then the conditional in the algorithm shows that 2 ?k > (! n ). (The combined probability of the mistakes is largest if they are concentrated in the rst predictions.) By the de nition of we have (! n ) 1=(n(n+1)). Together this shows k < 2 log n.
Example 3.1. If, in the proof, we put weight 2 ?K(n) on n (instead of 1=(n(n + 1))), then the number of mistakes is at most k < K(n). Recall that always K(n) log n + 2 log log n. But for regular n (say, n = 2 k ) the value K(n) drops to less that (1 + ) log log n, for all > 0. Of course, the prediction algorithm becomes none ective because we cannot compute these weights (K( ) is uncomputable). 
Proof. Otherwise we would be able to compute f, given x, from a program of length signi cantly shorter than K(fjx), which leads to a contradiction as follows. In 
Minimum Description Length
We can formulate scienti c theories in two steps. First, we formulate a set of possible alternative hypotheses, based on scienti c observations or other data. Second, we select one hypothesis as the most likely one. Statistics is the mathematics of how to do this. A relatively recent method in statistics was developed by J. Rissanen. The method can be viewed as a computable approximation to the noncomputable approach involving m or M and was inspired by it.
Minimum description length (MDL) principle. The best theory to explain a set of data is the one which minimizes the sum of the length, in bits, of the description of the theory; and the length, in bits, of data when encoded with the help of the theory. To be able to compute this minimum we need to severely restrict the allowable descriptions. The minimum description length is also called the stochastic complexity of the given data.
With a more complex description of the hypothesis H, it may t the data better and therefore decreases the misclassi ed data.
If H describes all the data, then it does not allow for measuring errors. A simpler description of H may be penalized by increasing the misclassi ed data. If H is a trivial hypothesis that contains nothing, then all data are described literally and there is no generalization. The rationale of the method is that a balance in between seems required. Let us see how we can derive the MDL principle. Recall Bayes' Rule
Here H is an hypothesis, and D is the set of observed data. We must nd the hypothesis H such that P(HjD) is maximized. Taking the negative logarithm of both sides of the formula, we obtain ? log P(HjD) = ? log P(DjH) ? log P(H) + log P(D):
We can assume P(D) is xed, since the data D is xed. This term can be considered as a normalizing factor and is ignored in the following discussion. We are only concerned with maximizing the term P(HjD) or, equivalently, minimizing the term ? log P(HjD). This is equivalent to minimizing ? log P(DjH) ? log P(H):
Let us assume that H and D are expressed as natural numbers or nite binary strings. If P is recursive, then 0 (HjP ) = log(m(H)=P (H)) is a universal sum Ptest as de ned in 13]. Since we are dealing with nite objects, we cannot sharply divide the objects in random ones and nonrandom ones. For nite objects, randomness is necessarily a matter of degree. Namely, it would be absurd if x is random and x with the rst nonzero bit set to 0 is nonrandom.
However, for each constant c, we can de ne c ?P-random H as those H such that 0 (HjP ) c. Fix a small constant c, and call the c ? P-random objects simply P-random. For suitably chosen c, the overwhelming majority of H's is P-random because
The analogous statement holds for P(DjH). Hence, for P-random H and D, we where K( ) is the pre x complexity. That is, in order to maximize P(HjD) over all hypotheses H, with high P-probability we need to minimize the sum of the minimum lengths of e ective self-delimiting programs which compute descriptions of H and DjH. Such self-delimiting programs (pre x codes) are achieved by constructive versions of the Shannon-Fano code.
The term ? log P(DjH) is also known as the self-information in information theory and the negative log-likelihood in statistics. It can now be regarded as the number of bits it takes to redescribe or encode D with an ideal code relative to H.
If we replace all P-probabilities in Then there exists a pre x code fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : g with l(x i ) = l i for all i. Conversely, if fx 1 ; x 2 ; : : : g is a pre x code, then its length set satis es the above inequality.
We consider a simple self-delimiting description of x. For example, let x is encoded by x 0 as above. This makes l(x 0 ) = log x + 2 log log x, which is a simple upper approximation of K(x). Since the length of code word sets of pre x codes corresponds with a probability distribution by Kraft's Inequality 4.3, this encoding corresponds with assigning probability 2 ?l(x 0 ) to x. In the MDL approach, this is the speci c usable approximation to the universal prior. In the literature we nd a more precise approximation which, however, has no practical meaning. For convenience, we smooth our encoding as follows. H. Je reys has suggested to assign probability 1=x to each integer x. But this results in an improper distribution since the harmonic series P 1=x diverges. In the Bayesian interpretation the prior distribution expresses one's prior knowledge about the`true' value of the parameter. This interpretation may be questionable, since the used prior is usually not generated by repeated random experiments. In Rissanen's view, the parameter is generated by the selection of the class of hypotheses and it has no inherent meaning. It is just one means to describe the properties of the data. The selection of H which minimizes K(H) + K(DjH) (or Rissanen's approximation thereof) allows one to make statements about the data. Since the complexity of the models plays an important part, the parameters must be encoded. To do so, we truncate them to a nite precision and encode them with the pre x code above. Such a code happens to be equivalent to a distribution on the parameters. This may be called the universal MDL prior, but its genesis shows that it expresses no prior knowledge about the true value of the parameter. See J. Rissanen, Stochastic Complexity and Statistical Inquiry, World Scienti c, 1989]. Above we have given a validation of MDL from Bayes' Rule, which holds irrespective of the assumed prior, provided it is recursive and the hypotheses and data are random. above. Under certain general conditions, J. Rissanen has shown that with k parameters and n data (for large n) Equation 4 .2 is minimized for hypotheses H with encoded by (k=2) log n bits. This is called the optimum model cost since it represents the cost of the hypothesis description at the minimum description length of the total.
As an example, consider a Bernoulli process (p; 1?p) with p close to 1=2. For such processes k = 1. Let the outcome be x = x 1 x 2 : : : x n . Set f x = P n i=1 x i .
For outcome x with C(x) n ? (n), the number of 1's can be estimated ( 13] )
With (n) = log n, the fraction of such x's in f0; 1g n goes to 1 with n rises unboundedly. Hence, for the overwhelming number of x's the frequency of 1's will be within 2 ?(1=2) log n?O(R) ; with O(R) log n; of the value 1=2. That is, to express an estimate to parameter p it su ces to use this precision. This requires at most (1=2) log n + O(R) bits. It is easy to generalize this example to arbitrary p. Example 4.2. In biological modeling, we often wish to t a polynomial f of unknown degree to a set of data points D = (x 1 ; y 1 ); : : : ; (x n ; y n ); such that it can predict future data y given x. Even if the data did come from a polynomial curve of degree, say two, because of measurement errors and noise, we still cannot nd a polynomial of degree two tting all n points exactly. In general, the higher the degree of tting polynomial, the greater the precision of the t. For n data points, a polynomial of degree n?1 can be made to t exactly, but probably has no predicting value. The possible hypotheses are (f; x), where f is a polynomial of degree at most n ? 1, and x = (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ). The vector x is a standard xed part of each hypothesis.
Let us apply the MDL principle where we describe all k?1-degree polynomials by a vector of k entries, each entry with a precision of d bits. Then, the entire polynomial is described by kd + O(log kd) bits. where n i is the number of times the value i occurs in the experiment. We show that the Maximum Entropy principle can be considered as a special case of the MDL principle, as follows.
Consider the same type of problem. Let = (p 1 ; : : : ; p k ) be the prior probability distribution of a random variable. We perform a sequence of n independent trials. Shannon has observed that the real substance of Formula 4.6 is that we need approximately nH( ) bits to record the sequence of n outcomes. Namely, it su ces to state that each outcome appeared n 1 ; : : : ; n k times, respectively, and afterwards give the index of which one of the n n 1 ; : : : ; n k = n! n 1 ! n k ! (4.9) possible sequences D of n outcomes actually took place. For this no more than k log n + log n n 1 ; : : : ; n k + O(log log n) (4.10) bits are needed. The rst term corresponds to ? log P( ), the second term corresponds to ? log P(Dj ), and the third term represents the cost of encoding separators between the individual items. Using Stirling's approximation of n! p 2 n(n=e) n for the quantity of Equation 4.9, we nd that, for large n, n i n log n i n ! = nH n 1 n ; : : : ; n k n :
Since k and n are xed, the least upper bound on the minimum description length, for an arbitrary sequence of n outcomes under certain given constraints 4.7 and 4.8, is found by maximizing the term in Equation 4.9 subject to said constraints. This is equivalent to maximizing the entropy function 4.6 under the constraints.
Viewed di erently, let S be the set of outcomes with values (n 1 ; : : : ; n k ), with n i = np i , corresponding to a distribution = (p 1 ; : : : ; p k ). Then due to the small number of values (k) in relative to the size of the sets, we have log X d(S ) max flogd(S )g:
The left-hand side of Equation 4.11 is is the minimum description; the right-hand side of Equation 4.11 is the maximum entropy.
Pointers to Applications of MDL
This approach has been applied to real world learning system design. Some rst applications were from learning decision trees 14] 
